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Appellant Odyssey Contracting Corp. and Appellee 
L&L Painting Co., Inc. were, respectively, a subcontractor and 
the prime contractor on a project to repaint the Queensboro 
Bridge.  Over the course of that project, Odyssey and L&L 
became embroiled in a dispute over whether L&L was 
underpaying Odyssey.  Consequently, Odyssey stopped its 
work, and the parties sued each other for breach of contract.  
After Odyssey filed for bankruptcy, this litigation became the 
subject of an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court. 
At the final pre-trial conference, the parties entered into 
a stipulation approved by the Bankruptcy Court.  The 
stipulation provided that if the Bankruptcy Court determined 
that Odyssey was the breaching party, then “all of the [p]arties’ 
pending claims will be withdrawn and disposed of in their 
entirety with prejudice” and the adversary proceeding “shall be 
deemed to be finally concluded in all respects.” 
Following a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Court 
concluded that Odyssey was the breaching party.  Accordingly, 
it entered an order “direct[ing] [the] parties to resolve the . . . 
adversary proceeding . . . in compliance with the [s]tipulation.”  
The order also required the parties to provide a status update 
within three weeks as to whether that had been done. 
Instead, Odyssey appealed to the District Court, seeking 
review of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that it was the 
breaching party.  L&L moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing 
that, under the terms of the stipulation, Odyssey had released 
its claims and waived its right to appeal.  The District Court 
agreed and modified the Bankruptcy Court’s order to make it a 
dismissal of the adversary proceeding with prejudice.   
Odyssey now appeals to us.  Because we agree that 
Odyssey waived its right to appeal by entering into the 
stipulation, we will affirm. 
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I. Jurisdiction 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 157(a) and 1334(b).  The District Court’s jurisdiction, on 
which our jurisdiction depends, is less certain. 
 
District courts have jurisdiction to “hear appeals . . . 
from final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy 
judges.”  28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  The order from which 
Odyssey appealed was the Bankruptcy Court’s order directing 
the parties to resolve the adversary proceeding per the 
stipulation and requiring a status update on whether that had 
been done.  Was this a final order conferring appellate 
jurisdiction on the District Court?  With some hesitation, we 
conclude that it was. 
 
“[C]onsiderations unique to bankruptcy appeals” 
require “constru[ing] finality in a more pragmatic, functional 
sense . . . .”  In re Prof’l Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 279 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Thus, “a bankruptcy court order ending a separate 
adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though 
that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”  Id. 
at 281 (quoting In re Moody, 817 F.2d 365, 367–68 (5th Cir. 
1987)).  But in determining whether an order deciding a 
specific adversary proceeding is final, we typically “apply the 
same concepts of appealability as those used in general civil 
litigation.”  In re White Beauty View, Inc., 841 F.2d 524, 526 
(3d Cir. 1988).  “A final judgment is one which ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 
but execute the judgment.”  Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 
419 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus an order 
is not final where it “contemplates the possibility of future 
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proceedings.”  Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234, 236 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
The Bankruptcy Court’s order here could suggest—if 
not contemplate—the possibility of future proceedings, as it 
required the parties to “file a joint status report indicating 
whether all actions in compliance with the [s]tipulation and 
[o]rder ha[d] been taken to resolve [the adversary proceeding] 
or, if . . . not, why [not,]. . . and what steps remain to be taken.” 
If Odyssey had not appealed when it did, the Bankruptcy Court 
may have issued a further order dismissing the parties’ claims 
pursuant to the stipulation.  Or it may have entertained a motion 
by L&L to enforce the stipulation.  But as things stood when 
Odyssey appealed, some further action was required—either 
by the parties or the Bankruptcy Court1—as the order did not 
itself dismiss the parties’ claims or provide that it would 
automatically ripen into a final order of dismissal absent some 
further action by the parties within a specified time period.  See 
United States v. Wang, 926 F.2d 92, 94–96 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(concluding that an order was final where it provided that a 
settlement agreement would take effect unless the parties 
agreed to modify it within sixty days, and noting that the order 
“did not instruct the parties to report back for further 
proceedings”); cf. Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 239–40 
(3d Cir. 2019) (holding that an order dismissing a case without 
prejudice may be final where it is “self-executing” because it 
                                              
1 The parties, for example, could have further stipulated to 
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, which 
would have required the Bankruptcy Court to take no further 
action to dismiss the matter.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) 
(providing that an action may be dismissed without a court 
order when a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties is 
filed); Fed. R. Bank. P. 7041 (providing that Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41 applies in adversary proceedings). 
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contains “language converting the dismissal to a final order at 
the end of [a specified] period”). 
On the other hand, “if only a ‘ministerial’ task remains 
for the court to perform”—such as calculating damages when 
that task is mechanical and uncontroversial—“then immediate 
appeal is allowed.”  Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 
F.3d 193, 200 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004).  Here, the most that remained 
for the Bankruptcy Court to do was to enter a further order 
dismissing the parties’ claims per the stipulation.  Perhaps 
recognizing this, the District Court declined to remand the case 
for the Bankruptcy Court to “further interpret and enforce its 
order approving the stipulation,” concluding that this would be 
“senseless[] given that Odyssey most[ ]likely would appeal the 
resulting[ ]decision” back to the District Court.  J.A. 7.  Instead, 
it took that small, ministerial step itself, modifying the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order to dismiss the adversary proceeding 
with prejudice. 
Because all that remained for the Bankruptcy Court to 
do was to dismiss the claims in accord with the stipulation, and 
mindful that in the bankruptcy context we construe finality in 
a more pragmatic, functional sense, we conclude that the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order was final such that the District Court 
had jurisdiction to consider Odyssey’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1).  And because that Court had appellate jurisdiction, 
we have jurisdiction to review its final order disposing of the 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291. 
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II. Analysis2 
Having determined that we have jurisdiction, we next 
consider whether Odyssey waived its right to appeal by 
agreeing to the stipulation.  We conclude that it did. 
In construing a stipulation, we consider first its plain 
language.  Waldorf, 142 F.3d at 612.  What the words indicate 
is that Odyssey waived its right to appeal the Bankruptcy 
Court’s determination that it was the breaching party. 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the stipulation set out the relevant 
language: 
1. In the event this Court [i.e., the 
Bankruptcy Court] determines after trial 
that Odyssey was the breaching party, 
then L&L’s damages claim for the said 
breach(es) will be deemed to exceed 
Odyssey’s damages claims for all of its 
claims . . . ; and, thereupon, all of the 
Parties’ pending claims will be 
withdrawn and disposed of in their 
entirety with prejudice by L&L and 
Odyssey, respectively. 
 
2. In the event the Court determines after 
trial that Odyssey was the breaching 
party, the Parties’ withdrawal and 
                                              
2 “Because the District Court sat [here] as an appellate court, 
[we] conduct[] the same review of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
order as did the District Court.”  In re Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d 
133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002).  Our review of the latter’s construction 
of the stipulation is plenary.  Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 
608 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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disposition of their respective claims . . . 
shall include all their damages claims for 
. . . any and all . . . alleged wrongdoing of 
any type or description; . . . and this 
proceeding shall be deemed to be finally 
concluded in all respects.  The Parties 
shall exchange mutual final releases 
reflecting the terms of this Stipulation. 
J.A. 473–74 (emphases added). 
The stipulation does not specifically refer to Odyssey’s 
right to appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s determination, yet 
several aspects of the above language indicate an intent to 
waive that right.   
First, the stipulation provides that, following the 
Bankruptcy Court’s determination, Odyssey will “thereupon 
. . . withdraw[] and dispose[] of” its claims.  Id. at 474.  
“[T]hereupon” indicates that Odyssey will resolve its claims 
“immediate[ly]; without delay; [or] promptly.”  Thereupon, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  It is difficult to 
reconcile this language with Odyssey’s reading of the 
stipulation, under which Odyssey need not dispose of its claims 
until after the resolution of one or more appeals, which would 
necessarily prolong the litigation. 
Second, the stipulation provides that, upon the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision, “this proceeding shall be deemed 
to be finally concluded in all respects.”  J.A. 474 (emphasis 
added).  Again, the possibility of an appeal is not consistent 
with this language: if an appeal were possible, then the 
proceeding is not finally concluded in all respects; indeed, the 
proceeding may continue on appeal and, should the appeal 
result in reversal, it may continue in the Bankruptcy Court. 
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Furthermore, paragraph 1 of the stipulation not only 
provides for the disposal of all of the parties’ pending claims, 
but specifies that this disposition is “with prejudice.”  The 
inclusion of this legal term of art undeniably established that if 
the Bankruptcy Court—not the District Court or the Court of 
Appeals—found Odyssey to be the party that breached the 
contract, the litigation would end.  In other words, the 
stipulation barred any appeal.  See With Prejudice, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
Apart from disputing the meaning of the stipulation’s 
plain language, the parties ask us to apply opposite rules of 
construction where the stipulation is silent as to the right to 
appeal.  Odyssey argues silence cuts in its favor, positing that 
a stipulation for a trial court to decide a certain claim does not 
waive the right to appeal the claim unless it is expressly 
waived.  L&L urges the opposite rule—under which silence 
would support its position—arguing that a stipulation to a 
certain resolution of a claim waives the right to appeal the 
claim unless the right is expressly reserved.  While neither 
party’s position finds direct support in our cases, L&L’s 
position is the better fit here.   
L&L relies on the well-established principle that a party 
cannot appeal from a consent judgment if it did not expressly 
reserve its right to do so.  See, e.g., Keefe v. Prudential Prop. 
& Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2000).  In Keefe 
we held that a party may appeal from a consent judgment in 
order to challenge some contested order preceding the 
judgment so long as “it is clear from the record that the parties 
stipulated to [the] consent judgment with the express 
understanding that the party against whom judgment was 
entered would appeal [the] contested issue.”  Id. at 223.  Our 
rationale for requiring a party to make clear its intent to appeal 
is to prevent unfair surprise to the opposing party, who agreed, 
after all, to settle the case without further litigation and “should 
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not be left guessing about the finality and hence efficacy of the 
settlement.”  Id. (quoting Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now 
v. Edgar (“ACORN”), 99 F.3d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1996)).   
Odyssey correctly points out that the stipulation here is 
not a consent judgment as it was in Keefe.  There the parties 
stipulated to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff with the 
understanding that the defendant would then appeal to seek 
review of a previous order—specifically, an order denying 
summary judgment to the defendant.  203 F.3d at 220.  Here, 
by contrast, the stipulation was entered before trial, setting out 
the effect that a subsequent determination at trial would have 
on the proceedings—specifically the determination that 
Odyssey was the breaching party.   
We conclude that this distinction makes no meaningful 
difference.  In both instances the parties have agreed to resolve 
and end the litigation based on the Court’s determination of a 
contested issue.  The parties did so in Keefe after the District 
Court decided the contested issue; here the parties did so 
prospectively, that is, before the contested issue was decided.  
But the rationale for the rule in Keefe applies equally in both 
circumstances: a party that agrees to resolve and end a case—
and thus gives up its right to press its claims or defenses in 
exchange for finality—should not be left guessing whether the 
opposing party can appeal.  Rather, the party seeking to appeal 
must make its intent to do so clear at the time of the stipulation.        
For its part, Odyssey relies on cases from our sister 
circuits that it contends establish a different rule: where the 
parties have stipulated that a trial court will decide a certain 
issue, the right to appeal must be expressly waived.  See, e.g., 
In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 986, 997 (5th Cir. 2015); 
Montez v. Hickenlooper, 640 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 
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2011).3  But even assuming these cases are persuasive, they are 
distinguishable in a significant way: they involve class-action 
consent decrees, in which the parties established a dispute 
resolution procedure for addressing individual class members’ 
claims over which a district court was made the decisionmaker.  
In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d at 989; Montez, 640 F.3d 
at 1129.     
The interest at stake in those cases was different from 
that at issue here.  In class actions, settlement agreements 
cannot be approved unless the court determines that they are 
“fundamentally fair, reasonable, and adequate,” the purpose of 
                                              
3 Odyssey also relies on two of our decisions, Nicholson v. 
Altona Corp., 320 F.2d 8, 12 (3d Cir. 1963), and Anderson v. 
White, 888 F.2d 985, 990–91 (3d Cir. 1989).  Both are 
distinguishable, as neither involved a stipulation setting the 
process for resolving and ending the litigation.   
 
In Nicholson the parties stipulated that the defendant 
would deposit a check in escrow to satisfy “any [j]udgment that 
may be rendered . . . in favor of plaintiff.”  320 F.2d at 12.  We 
held that this stipulation did not waive the defendant’s right to 
appeal the judgment.  Id.   
 
In Anderson the Court entered summary judgment in 
favor of all defendants except one (Kravitz), who had failed to 
move for summary judgment even though the claims against 
her turned on the same issues.  888 F.2d at 990.  Recognizing 
this oversight prevented an immediate appeal, the plaintiffs and 
Kravitz stipulated to entry of summary judgment for Kravitz.  
Id.  We held the stipulation did not waive the plaintiffs’ right 
to appeal and had merely “cure[d] a procedural problem.”  Id. 
at 991. 
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which is to “protect unnamed members of the class from unjust 
or unfair settlements.”  Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 
590, 592–93 (3d Cir. 2010).  It may be that the interest in 
protecting individual class members requires an explicit waiver 
of the right to appeal.  But that interest does not apply in our 
case, which involves a dispute between sophisticated business 
entities.  What does apply is the interest we identified in 
Keefe—preventing a party from being caught by surprise or 
“left guessing about the finality and hence efficacy of the 
[stipulation for resolution].”  Keefe, 203 F.3d at 223 (quoting 
ACORN, 99 F.3d at 262).   
In sum, the language of the stipulation confirms 
Odyssey’s intent to end all its pending claims if the Bankruptcy 
Court rules that Odyssey breached its contract with L&L.  And 
this construction is further supported by the rule we set out in 
Keefe: a party that seeks to appeal must make its intent to do 
so clear at the time of the stipulation setting the manner for 
resolution.  Accordingly, we conclude that Odyssey waived its 
right to appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s order and will affirm 
the order of the District Court. 
